

Adaptive Learning of an International Non-governmental Organization in the Process of Development Projects for Internally Displaced Persons in Sudan¹

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Abstract

The present thesis investigated, using intensive fieldwork, three projects that were implemented by an international non-governmental organization (NGO) named the International Rescue Committee (IRC) to promote personal and social development for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Khartoum State, Sudan. The projects pioneered in the country where almost all projects by NGOs had been extended for emergency relief and rehabilitation, not for long-term development.

In the first project named the Capacity Building and Organizational Capacity Assessment Project, the IRC provided workshops in which staff of national NGOs, i.e., Sudanese NGOs, participated to improve their capacities that were required to extend better services to IDPs. In the second project, named the FAIR project, the IRC focused on university graduates among IDPs and trained them to be leaders who were expected to perform educational functions in capacity building, peace building, and gender awareness in IDP communities. In the third project, named the Sudanese Youth Peace Building Initiative, the IRC attempted to transform the culture of war into a culture of peace by providing training sessions in which young people, including IDPs, participated to learn how problems, in politics or in everyday life, could be solved in a collaborative, not antagonistic, way.

Analyzing each project from the viewpoints of adapting learning, we suggested that the IRC evolved to better the IDPs' life, a practical necessity. The path of evolution was demonstrated by an increase of participation of IDPs in the implementation process of a project. Evolution was also observed in the way in which the IRC expanded their scope of view to reach a point where long-term and large-scale cultural transformations could be pursued in the third project. It was expected (and hoped) that this collaborative relationship, grown among international NGOs, national NGOs, IDPs, and, Sudanese people, might change distrust into trust between international NGOs and the Sudanese government.

Keywords: internally displaced persons (IDP), non-governmental organization (NGO), Sudan, development project

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1. Internal Displacement and NGOs in Sudan

Internally displaced persons, IDPs, are people forced, in large numbers, to leave their original place of residence and move elsewhere in the same country because of natural disaster, armed conflict, or political, religious, or racial persecution. Their classification differs from refugees who are forced to cross a national boarder to avoid natural or man-made disasters (The United Nations, 1995). The number of IDPs worldwide was estimated at thirty million (Deng, 2000).

The UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) reported that Sudan had about four million IDPs and about 160,000 refugees from neighboring countries. In 2000, intertribal conflicts caused a massive internal displacement in the southern and western parts of the country when a civil war erupted in 1983 after an eleven-year peaceful period. In addition, in 1983 and 1984, western Sudan was struck by severe waves of drought. Hundreds of thousands of animals were lost and agricultural activities were severely compromised due to shortage of water resources. A huge number of people gave up living in their original place and moved to northern parts of the country, specifically major cities and towns like Dongola, Kosti, Wad Medani, and the capital, Khartoum.

In 1991, the squatter settlements of IDPs in Khartoum began to be demolished as part of an urban renewal plan that the government formulated with the assistance of the World Bank. Many IDPs were relocated to four official camps that were established around Khartoum city in 1992. About 250,000 of the 1.8 million IDPs in Khartoum now live mainly in the four camps, i.e. Assalam Jebel Awlia, Wad El-Bechir, Mayo Farms, and Assalam Oumdurman (Banaga, 2001). See Picture 1.

Because of the massive internal displacement, the government of Sudan publicized a plea for the international community to intervene in 1984. This was known as the Sudan Call. The country, as a result, became a hub for huge humanitarian operations. A number of relief and rehabilitation projects for IDPs were launched by national and international non-governmental organizations and the United Nations in collaboration with the national government. The four camps became a major field for such projects.

NGOs that came from abroad, mainly from European countries and the US, are referred to as international NGOs whereas NGOs composed of Sudanese people are referred to as national NGOs. The number of NGOs reached 170 in 2001 according to the NGO directory issued by Sudan Council of Voluntary Agencies (SCOVA, 2001). Among them, 62% were national and 38% were international. Generally, national NGOs tend to be inferior to international NGOs in financial strength, organizational management, and necessary knowledge and skills.

The government has maintained an ambivalent attitude toward international NGOs. On the positive side, their assistance is integral in order to deal with a huge number of vulnerable people like IDPs but because of differences in cultural and religious backgrounds they are not easily trusted and sometimes perceived as dangerous with regard to political intervention. Three governmental organizations are in charge of supervising international NGOs (Nogid, 2001):

(1) Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs: The Ministry of the national government succeeded, in 2000, the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) that was established to supervise all voluntary and humanitarian activities in Sudan according to the act of 1995. The Ministry is directly in charge of registration, supervision, and follow-up of international NGOs. Every international NGO is required to sign the country agreement and register at the Ministry as an entity who can enter the country to extend philanthropic activities.



Picture 1. IDP camp in Mayo

(2) Humanitarian Aid Commission/Khartoum State (HAC/KS): After four official IDP camps were established at the Khartoum outskirts, Humanitarian Aid Department (HAD) of the Khartoum state government started to administer the camps. HAD is now called HAC/KS. Supervision for international NGOs working in the camps is one of its major responsibilities. Each year, international NGOs are required to sign the state agreement with HAC/KS to start any kind of activities in the camps.

(3) Department of Voluntary Agencies (DOVA): This department was established in 1995 under the direct supervision of Department of Primary Health Care of the Ministry of Health of the Khartoum state government. DOVA technically supervises both international and national NGOs. All NGOs intending to implement medical projects in Khartoum state are required to sign the technical agreement with DOVA after signing both agreements above. The technical agreement specifies obligations that NGOs have their training and surveys inspected by DOVA and accept technical support and supervision by DOVA.

All NGOs who plan to extend projects in the area of health in Khartoum state are required to submit the Detailed Information Sheet (DIS) to obtain a project license. Information on starting and finalizing dates, manpower on both administrative and operation levels, partner organizations to collaborate, and a target group of project is indicated in the DIS.

Many NGOs regard these documents and the supervision exercised by government staff as a waste of time and money which disrupts and disturbs the daily necessary work. It is burdensome for the governments that must process many jobs with insufficient budget and manpower. This is particularly true for HAC/KS who must deal with many NGOs that rush into Khartoum state. However, such attempts to control NGOs, especially international NGOs, have continued because of distrust.

Activities of international NGOs in Sudan have been characterized so far by their concentration on relief and rehabilitation in emergency situations and lack of projects to promote

middle- or long-term development of people and communities in the country. Examples of development projects include: vocational training for impoverished people to earn a livelihood combined with introduction of a micro-credit structure to enable them to start a small business, an educational program to increase awareness of the human rights of women and children, and a consciousness raising program to teach the importance of a peaceful and constructive way of conflict resolution along with necessary skills.

A major reason for lack of development projects is that backers of large donations for an international NGO tend to be reluctant to support Islamic countries, especially countries that are governed by a regime of Islamic fundamentalists. And Sudan is one example of an area with such religious and political background. In addition, the civil war that continued over a prolonged period made it difficult for a donator to extend funds for long-term development projects that were easily collapsed by an armed conflict. As evidenced by the above impediments, it has been difficult for an international NGO to start a development project despite the government's demand for such a project as written in the conditions of the country agreement.

2. The International Rescue Committee (IRC)

The IRC is one of a few international NGOs involved in development projects beyond relief and rehabilitation for IDPs, which were investigated for this study using fieldwork methods. The IRC was born in 1942 by the merger of two humanitarian organizations: the US branch of the European-based International Relief Association that assisted those who were oppressed by Hitler, Mussolini, and Franco regimes, and the Emergency Rescue Committee who aided European refugees trapped in Vichy France. Since then, the mission of the IRC has been to provide assistance to refugees around the world. It helps those fleeing racial, religious and ethnic persecution, in addition to all those victimized by either war or violence. At the outbreak of a national emergency, the IRC provides sanctuary and lifesaving assistance and immediately starts to deliver medical services, food, and shelter. Once the initial crisis subsides, the IRC sets up programs to enable victims to cope with life in exile through training and education and plans for generating income. Donators to the IRC come from a wide array of agencies, among them the United Nations. Other contributors are intergovernmental organizations, agencies of national and local governments, and private sector's agencies, institutions, foundations and corporations. The IRC inaugurated its activities in Sudan in 1985 through the establishment of medical healthcare centers and training projects for refugees who fled Marxist dictatorship in Ethiopia. A few years later, the flow became even greater for the Tigre from Eritrea whose independence movement was under siege. The IRC expanded its activities to include IDPs in central and southern parts of the country in 1989. The IRC operates in all four IDP camps in Khartoum in addition to the Haj Yusuf re-planned area. The IRC also functions in war-affected areas in the south such as Auil, Raja, Malakal, and Wau (see Picture 2).

These activities range from humanitarian intervention to development projects. A list of major accomplishments follows with the exception of three development projects that will be described in detail in the next section.

- In 1998, a project to improve IDP women's lives was started in Mayo and Jebel Aulia camps in Khartoum state. In this project, Women in Development (WID), vocational training was given to women while a micro-credit plan was introduced. Success of the project led to similar projects in Bahr El Ghazal State in 1999 and in Aweil and Raja areas in 2003.



Picture 2. Office of the IRC in Mayo camp

- In 1999, a project was started to establish a clinic for reproductive health in Wau, Bahr El Ghazal. Primary health care, immunization for children under five years old, and a variety of reproductive health services were given to IDPs.
- In 1999 - 2003, about 1,500 family latrines were constructed. New water pipes were installed to provide potable drinking water to 37,000 people in Malakal, a town in the southern Sudan. Forty five staff were trained to be community hygiene promoters, involved in home visits, a cleaning campaign, and public health education in a local community.
- In 2000, a project to secure water, sanitation, shelter, and health awareness was conducted for more than 20,000 IDPs in five camps in Kassala, a part of eastern Sudan.
- In 2001, a series of educational workshop was started to increase awareness of the human rights of women and children in Wau, Bahr El Ghazal state, a part of southern Sudan.
- From 2002, a wide range of urgent projects to secure water and sanitation, agriculture aid, capacity building, poverty alleviation, and peace building were extended for a total of 59 frontline villages in Nuba mountains that were controlled by both the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).

3. Three Development Projects by the IRC

Three development projects of the IRC were investigated using intensive fieldwork from 2002-2005 in this study. For each project, the first author of this paper interacted with indigenous people in office rooms, training rooms of the IRC and its partner organizations, and in IDP camps as a participant observer. Reports and documents were made available for the study through the courtesy of the IRC and its partners. A huge amount of interview data was collected from the project implementer and the recipient of services provided by the project. Questionnaire surveys were carried out in one of the three projects.

(1) Capacity building for national NGOs (The CARE project)

No doubt a national NGO had an advantage over an international NGO in providing a long-term development service directly for IDPs because of its shared cultural background. For this reason, the IRC required partnership with national NGOs to start a series of development projects in Sudan. But, there were few national NGOs who were capable enough to meet expectations of the IRC. It was necessary for the IRC to start a project to increase the level of national NGOs as a partner organization so that they could work directly for IDPs under the supervision of the IRC.

The project for capacity building for national NGOs called the Corporation for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) was implemented for four years, 1998-2001. The project was composed of a series of workshops in which two domains, i.e., health issues and organizational management of NGO, were focused on. Each workshop lasted from 9:00 to 16:00 for two to five days. An average of sixteen trainees participated in a single workshop. In addition to lectures, active participation methods like brainstorming, role-playing, and a case method using a video film were adopted. A total of 130 workshops were held for 1,900 trainees.

In the area of health issues, national NGO staff who worked for health management, reproductive health, family planning and primary health care was trained to improve their knowledge and skills. For technical knowledge, 160 professional public health staff members were trained in 10 workshops. For general health awareness, 260 professional public health staff members were trained in 11 courses, and 269 non-professional public health staff members were trained in 26 courses. For the sensitivity to and awareness of gender relations, law, and age, 180 NGO staff members were trained in 9 courses.

Training in the area of organizational management for the administrative staff of national NGOs covered topics such as proposal writing, fund-raising, finance, strategic planning, and time management, general understanding of the human rights of women and children, and coping strategies for disaster and conflict. For this goal, 237 senior national staff members were trained through 16 workshops. Networking and coordination with international NGOs as well as among national NGOs were emphasized. National NGO staff was provided with access to resource materials, office equipment, and other facilities.

The IRC monitored and evaluated the project by hiring external consultants in 1999 and 2000. Written reports were reviewed. A questionnaire survey was administered to trainees and the training staff of the IRC, and trainees' supervisors in their workplaces were interviewed separately by visiting their offices. In the conclusions, the consultant reported that both the majority of trainees and their supervisors appreciated the outcome of the project. For example, of 241 trainees, 77% reported 'the course made the trainees do their job much better'; 17% reported 'slightly better' whereas only 6% reported 'very little effect.' Similar evaluations were found in the responses of their supervisors.

Based on experiences of the capacity building project above, in 2003, the IRC started a new project to assess organizational capacity of national NGOs as well as CBOs (Community-Based Organizations) who were already partners of the IRC. The major purpose was to determine what kind of support would be required for each partner to overcome its weak points and how the IRC could lend support. The assessment was conducted both on individual and group/organizational level. Interview and questionnaire methods were adopted for the former: group discussions and participant observations for the latter. The assessment was

followed by a meeting in which roles and responsibilities of the IRC and partner NGOs/CBOs were discussed based on their indicated needs.

(2) Empowerment of IDPs by IDPs (The FAIR project)

The CARE project in the last section was significant in that it represented a new direction of activities of the IRC, namely, a development project for IDPs that could emphasize more than relief and rehabilitation. As a first step, the efficiency level of national NGOs who were expected to enter a community of IDPs and to have direct relations with them as partners of the IRC was elevated. But, the IDPs themselves were only passive recipients of the programs extended by national NGOs and not given any active roles so that they could participate in the project.

The IRC started another project in 2001 with an international NGO called Fellowship of African Relief (FAR). In this project the two initial characters of FAR and IRC were combined for the name, FAIR. FAIR attempted to directly empower IDPs and their communities by utilizing university graduates of IDPs who were trained in the project.

The FAIR project succeeded major activities of the Women in Development (WID) project. As mentioned in a prior section, the WID project was designed to raise the awareness of women's rights and the value of women, and to provide them with a sense of empowerment and self-confidence. To do this, the IRC trained women among IDPs with a series of vocational projects (e.g. recycling aluminum, manufacturing perfumes, manufacturing leather products, and shoes). The project was handed over, in 2001, to a national NGO named Azza Women's Association (AWA) that had been committed to the improvement of women's social status and was a major partner of the IRC in the WID project.

In 2000, the FAIR project was started by the IRC and the FAR, with collaboration of the AWA as a main partner. Beside the AWA, four national NGOs as well as thirty CBOs participated in the project as partners (FAIR, 2002). The IRC and FAR, as project supervisors, provided all possible technical assistance for national NGOs and CBOs, and took responsibilities for funding, management, monitoring and evaluation of the project. Expanding on the learning experiences in the WID project, men among IDPs were recruited for a target group of empowerment, which was crucial in enhancing awareness of HIV.

The FAIR project attempted to directly empower IDPs by selecting practitioners from communities of IDPs and giving training by experts of the IRC. Specifically, university graduates among IDPs played a role of the practitioner. The majority of members of the national NGOs and the CBOs who were partners of the IRC/FAR were IDPs who had been trained by experts of the IRC. The project took place in five locations: four official IDP camps and one re-planned area in the suburbs of Khartoum North called Hajyusif or Baraka.

Major achievements in the FAIR project were as following:

(1) Kindergarten and preschool education were provided for 600 children of IDPs. Seven kindergartens took part in the FAIR project in the IDP camps and Hajyusif. Among the seven kindergartens, three were newly established by the FAIR project. University graduates took part in educating children. Educational materials and classroom equipment were prepared and maintained by national NGOs. The kindergarten education had an additional benefit in that it was used to encourage the children's mothers to attend other activities of the FAIR project.

(2) Training for capacity building, peace building, and gender awareness were given to 3,500 IDPs. IDPs received training from IDP graduates on the issues that were important to

improve life in their community such as leadership skills, awareness of sexually transmitted diseases, sensitivity to gender equality, availability of family planning, health consequences of female genital mutilation, signs of alcohol abuse, and prevention or intervention in cases of domestic violence. These social concerns were taught in workshops where participants debated the issues. Gender awareness was the prerequisite for participation in the training of the other issues. Regarding alcohol abuse, male participants were likely to agree with a trainer that it was not just waste of time and money but a major reason of domestic violence against a wife which also had a negative impact on child rearing.

(3) National NGOs of partners of the IRC/FAR empowered other national NGOs to help them provide better services to IDPs. For this purpose, training in the areas of advocacy, research, fundraising, and community mobilization was provided. This gave an opportunity for many partner national NGOs to participate in the FAIR project.

(4) Micro finance was made available for 300 IDPs who received vocational skill training by IDP university graduates. A market survey was conducted by the AWA and another national NGO to identify what kind of small industries might be useful for IDPs. As a result, training for the manual production of women's accessories, traditional food processing, and handicrafts were provided. In the micro-credit program, small capital was provided for CBOs who had been involved in extending vocational training to IDPs so that they could start small business by hiring IDPs who had received the training.

(5) Management skill training was extended to 150 managers from 30 CBOs that were serving IDP communities in Khartoum. A special training package was designed to meet the needs of CBO managers. The training program covered management and strategic planning, fund raising, and monitoring and evaluation.

(6) Networking was developed to enhance CBO's collaboration in IDP communities. For this, training was provided, by IDP graduates, for those CBO managers in coordination and networking. A fund was raised to help develop such a network.

Each activity in the FAIR project was evaluated by staff of the IRC using pre- and post-questionnaires that were administered to IDP graduates. 74% of the graduates reported that their participants looked enthusiastic and that the most active participants were middle-aged females. They stressed that literacy education was crucial to success of any future programs with and for IDPs.

(3) Transformation of the culture of war into a culture of peace

Because of a prolonged civil war that lasted nearly forty years soon after the independence of Sudan, the culture of war, in which a win-lose type of conflict resolution under distrust, was more dominant than a culture of peace where a win-win setting of mutual trust. This world view was infiltrated not only into political settings but into the everyday life of ordinary people. The Sudanese Youth Peace Building Initiative, conducted by the IRC since 2000, is one of a few valuable projects to transform the culture of war into a culture of peace in Sudan. It is safe to say that the Initiative is the first project in the country that aimed at such a cultural transformation along with a strong emphasis on development.

The Initiative was initially proposed by the IRC, but was implemented by the two partners: Azza Women Association (AWA) and Center for Peace and Development Studies (CPDS) of Juba University with a fund that is allocated every three months by the IRC. The AWA had experienced close collaboration with the IRC in the WID and FAIR projects for several years until

the inception of the Initiative. The AWA played a central role in the process of implementation of the Initiative. For the CPDS, an academic institute in a university, it was a new experience to participate as a partner in the process of implementation in a humanitarian project.

The core program consisted of training sessions of four hours a day for ten days, a total of forty hours. Trainees were young males and females between 14 to 24 years old including many IDPs. Trainers were young people who had been selected by partner national NGOs to attend the training of trainers, called a TOT, given at the start of the project. Certain trainers were selected from those who had completed the training with high achievement records. The plan was to organize and hold a workshop for peace building in each of their communities by implementing the skills they learned in the training programs they attended.

Two policies were emphasized in developing a training program: first, moving from everyday experience to political issue; second, a mixture of lecture and practice (brain storming, role playing, and short presentations by participants). Three examples, one from the first day, and two from the seventh and eighth days follow;

On the second day, a lecture on the role of a third party in conflict resolution was given, followed by a role-playing. At the beginning, the concept of a third party was explained as a tool for conflict resolution. The metaphor of a tool kit for a carpenter was used to explain that in human relations people need help in the form of a third party the same way that a carpenter needs tools in order to make furniture. Participants were encouraged to practice and make use of third parties in their role playing.

Three kinds of situations were compared and contrasted: 1) two people alone sitting together and talking about their problem, 2) two people sitting with a third party to resolve the problem, and 3) two people sitting in a court room with a judge as a third party. In the first example, it was demonstrated that the two people were likely to fall into an endless dispute without reaching any solutions. In the second situation, a third party did not help unless he or she maintained absolute neutrality for the two, and in the third example, even a simple conflict was sometimes complicated in an undesirable manner. Participants were encouraged to adopt the second situation rather than the first but with a neutral third party. Neutrality was explained in detail, using simple and understandable examples. For instance: 'if you offer a red chair to one of the two, you must also offer a red chair to the other,' or 'if you smile at one, you must also smile at another'. The concepts of win-win and win-lose were explained. In conceptual terminology, this meant that both sides would need to compromise in order to resolve the conflict to a level of less than perfection for either side but a resolution where both would benefit.

On the last session of the day, participants were divided into three-person groups in order to demonstrate (using role-playing) how a third party could intervene in a conflict of two persons. The situation was set up to be based on a Sudanese funeral custom. One person (A) collaborated with his/her several relatives to serve coffee and tea for many guests who came to attend a funeral of his/her relative who had passed away, but another person (B) among his/her relatives totally neglected such a service. A aggressively accused B of an cooperative attitude and B struck back with justification. Both tried to defeat each other. A and B were assumed to be kept in separate rooms, holding the anger inside themselves. Another person (C) who happened to hear about the fight entered the situation in order to reconcile the conflict between the two. Each role was assigned to each participant in a group. The setting was explained to the group and role-playing started from the scene in which C had to visit each of the two separate rooms as a third party.

Three suggestions were given to a third party by the trainer: 1) Don't say anything about what was wrong; 2) If A or B concentrates solely on a detailed explanation to justify his or her own behavior, stop it; 3) Emphasize the benefit that A and B might be able to gain by meeting each other once again to talk about their problems. After the role-playing exercise, all participants got together to share their experiences in the groups of three and to hear the trainer's comments.

On the seventh day, the civil war in Sudan was focused on. At the beginning, participants summarized the historical process and the current situation of the war. The trainer interjected with comments, when necessary, to correct apparent misunderstandings and reaffirm what was generally accepted as true. At the time, actual peace talks were going on and participants were encouraged to express their opinions, feelings, and future aspirations. On the eighth day, destructive affects of the civil war were elucidated, specifically by looking at how major infrastructure projects were affected. A trainer presented the history of several well known agricultural development projects that had been terminated by the war. Each group of several participants formed a fictional formal conference and focused on one project. They discussed how they could reactivate and resume the project through completion.. The participants unanimously agreed that it would be impossible to resume the projects without terminating the war.

Since the Initiative started in 2000, a total number of 2,050 young people have been educated. The initiative faced many problems. First, coordination systems were not sufficiently developed between the IRC and its major partner, the AWA. For example, no timetable for periodic meetings had been set up between the IRC and its partners. This was not only our observation but the conclusion of coordinators for peace projects of both the IRC and the AWA and appeared to be the most serious impediment to more efficient implementation of the project. The IRC depended on reports submitted by the partners in grasping how the implementation was progressing. If they did not receive these reports, it was impossible to judge the progress of the project. Coordination among as well as between partners was also a problem. For example, in March 2003, when the AWA started to conduct workshops in Gedarif and Port Sudan as part of extending the project in each state, another partner organization, CPDS of Juba University, had not completed signing the agreement with IRC and thus could not join the AWA in a timely manner.

Second, there were problems of funding, not only in the amount, but in the time it took to make a fund available. For example, the AWA was obliged to postpone the start of implementation in the Initiative by two months in December 2002 because the budget was not available until then although a financial request had been submitted to the IRC on time. Moreover, the amount the AWA received from the IRC was only half of the amount that had been requested by the AWA and accepted by the IRC. This forced the AWA to rely on loans from its other projects and aggravated its financial balance. Shortage of funds also hindered the expansion of a workshop in a community by young people who had completed the training above.

Third, it was necessary to overcome social problems for the promotion of the Initiative. When the AWA entered Port Sudan to start the project in 2000, police and security forces advised the AWA to separate participants on a tribal basis because intertribal conflict was tense there and had been strife with armed conflicts and civil wars. However, the AWA persistently insisted that a policy of equal participation of young people regardless of tribal differences was integral in promoting peace building in Sudan. Fortunately, the AWA was able to start the project without compromising their policy.

Another social problem to overcome was the reticence of community leaders to embrace the project, that is, how community leaders could be convinced of the project's importance. In efforts to access young people and encourage them to participate in the workshop, it was necessary to obtain permission that depended on approval or understanding of the project from community leaders, such as traditional community leaders, tribal leaders, or administrative officers. Some of the leaders were afraid that their positions would be threatened if young people were enlightened or educated in a new way like the workshop. To those leaders, it was emphasized that knowledge of peace building would be helpful and complement, rather than compete with, their heritage or traditional knowledge. Some leaders were afraid that young people would be too passionate to seek a peaceful conflict resolution and that they were more likely to intensify a conflict rather than resolve it constructively. Staff of the IRC and its partners developed a diversity of persuasive discourses for such leaders.

Fourth, some problems were found in the workshop process. Sometimes, trainers failed in time management. For example, young participants often became so enthusiastic in discussing politics that a trainer could not find a way to stop it and go ahead to the next subject. A forceful attitude to stop discussion was often taken as lack of interest or involvement in a sensitive political issue by participants. Another problem was that all training manuals were in the English language although most of them could not read or speak English fluently. It became a necessity to examine the level of education and the teaching materials in order to fit them with participants' experiences and backgrounds.

4. Conclusions: Adaptive Learning

Three projects that were carried out by the IRC were investigated through a series of intensive fieldwork programs. All of the projects shared an orientation toward middle or long-term development for IDPs beyond short-term relief and rehabilitation in an emergency. The results produced valuable information which may be useful in the future since such development projects -- rare in the past-- are expected to grow in Sudan where a peace treaty was established and the civil war ended very recently in January, 2005.

The first project, the CARE, aimed at increasing the capacity level of national NGOs. Generally, western NGOs wanted to develop partnerships with national NGOs since it was easier for national NGOs to establish a relationship of trust with IDPs than western NGOs. Such a partnership was critically important in long-term development projects. However, it was not easy for western NGOs to find national NGOs who had enough technical knowledge and administrative skills to work with them. The first project resulted from the need of the IRC to shift its activities from short-term relief and rehabilitation to a development project.

The first project was successful to the extent that it was appreciated by staffs of national NGOs who participated in the workshop. At the same time, there was room for improvement, i.e. greater involvement of national NGOs because national NGOs were not allowed to participate in the planning stage of the workshop. Unilateral relations between the IRC and national NGOs remained dominant even in the implementation stage of the workshop. It should be noted that IDPs were not directly included in any implementation stage of this project although they were, the ultimate beneficiaries. The lessons from this project were utilized to ameliorate the next project.

In the second project, the FAIR, IDP communities were envisioned to become empowered

in various domains like peace building, gender awareness, pre-school education, and micro-economics. These empowerment programs were planned and implemented mainly by leaders among IDPs, namely, IDP university graduates who had learned technical and administrative skills in training sessions organized by the IRC/FAR. Through this, a new activity where IDPs themselves pursued the development of IDP communities started.

However, there still remained room for IDPs' greater participation even though the second project significantly increased the venues for participation. Planning of the training sessions for IDP graduates was made exclusively by the IRC/FAR and they needed to be part of the implementation. Perhaps more participation of IDPs in the initial stages of a project will be possible as IDPs accumulate their experiences of involvement in development projects in the future.

The third project, the Sudanese Youth Peace Building Initiative, expanded the temporal perspective in the sense that cultural transformation was aimed at a transformation of the culture of war into a culture of peace while maintaining participation of IDPs in the project. A history of nearly a forty-year civil war promoted the culture of war into all corners in the country. This could be seen embodied in the frequent use of the win-lose type of conflict resolution in everyday life, where it was naturally assumed that conflict, personal or political, could be terminated only by the winning of one side and the loss of another. The third project aimed at transforming this detrimental process into a new form of conflict resolution in which both sides would try to explore a win-win solution in which both could benefit and accept a gain even if smaller than perceived as an ideal.

It should be noted that young people were focused on as a change agent of culture in this project. Cultural transformation takes a long time to achieve even if it goes smoothly and only young people have enough time left in their lives to experience such a long-term transformation. The focus on youth indicated that the IRC could expand its goals so that the next generation was taken into consideration in their activities.

Based on the findings above, the IRC evolved to adapt to the practical necessity of betterment of IDPs' life. The path of evolution is evidenced in the increase of participation of IDPs in the implementation processes of a project. In the first project, IDPs were not involved in any of the stages. The project was designed for national NGOs who were expected to work for IDPs. But, in the second project, they became an essential part of the project. All the IDP community members participated in the project including ordinary IDPs, university graduates from the IDP community, and CBOs and NGOs serving the IDPs. Finally, in the third project, participation became even broader to include all young people, including IDPs.

Evolution was also observed in the way in which the IRC expanded their scope to reach a point where a project for long-term cultural transformation was initiated. The initiative included young IDPs and youth from an entire society. Hopefully, this inclusive vision will guarantee permanence for the new changes toward understanding the necessity of a culture of peace. The trained youth are expected to continue their effort and contribute to the transformation process by using much of the time in their long and bright future.

Through the evolution above, a new relation between the IRC and the Sudanese might be attained. The Sudanese, mainly IDPs, are not just passive objects to be relieved on a short-term basis. They are partners with whom the IRC can promote a project in more efficient way. Moreover, they are partners with whom the IRC might be able to change the culture in a collaborative way.

Such collaboration might change the relationship between the Sudanese government and international NGOs that has been one of distrust so far. Formerly, the Sudanese government kept encouraging international NGOs to move to development projects rather than providing relief, but international NGOs did not react positively to this format. The IRC took the initiative and started obvious efforts in the development of IDP communities. Such efforts might be able to encourage the Sudanese government to stretch its trust to international NGOs. Ideally, IRC's direct collaboration with, and involvement of, IDPs in the development projects will encourage other international NGOs to start extending development projects for IDPs.

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スーダン国内避難民のための成長プロジェクトを通じた 国際 NGO の適応的学習

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スーダンでは、1955－2004年にわたる長期の内戦に加え、1980年代前半の深刻な飢饉によって、400万にもものぼる国内避難民が発生した。南部を中心に発生した避難民は、当初、北部の首都ハルツームに流入したが、1992年、政府は、首都郊外の砂漠に4つの避難民キャンプを設置し、避難民を移住させた。避難民キャンプの生活環境は劣悪を極めた。そのような避難民を救援するために、海外から多数の非政府組織（NGO）が活動を開始した。ただし、海外 NGO は、スーダン政府に批判的な行為に及ぶこともあったため、スーダン政府は、国レベル、州レベルで海外 NGO の活動を監督する組織を設けた。

本研究は、ほとんどの海外 NGO の活動が短期的な緊急救援に終始するなか、例外的に中長期的な避難民の育成・成長を目的とする活動を展開していた NGO「International Rescue Committee（IRC）」の活動を検討したものである。具体的には、IRC が 2002－05年にわたって実施した3つのプロジェクトを、筆者（第1著者）がプロジェクトに参加しつつ観察、検討した。

第1のプロジェクトは、海外 NGO と協力して活動に携わる国内 NGO のレベルアップを目的として実施された。2－5日のワークショップが130回開催され、合計1,900名の国内 NGO スタッフが、健康問題に取り組む上で必要な知識やスキル、および、救援プロジェクトのマネジメント方法に関する研修を受けた。

第2のプロジェクトは、避難民の中にいる少数の大学卒業者を対象に、彼らが、避難民キャンプにおける教育活動、平和のための活動、女性の人権擁護活動でリーダーシップをとれるようにすることを目的とした。まず、大学卒業者に基礎的な研修を受けてもらい、その上で、避難民のための6つのプロジェクトが、彼らをリーダーとして実施された。

第3のプロジェクトは、避難民を含む若者たちを対象に、好戦的文化を平和的文化に転換することを目的とした。スーダンでは、長年の内戦で、好戦的文化が社会の隅々にまで浸透してしまっている。これを、将来を担う若者の態度を変えることによって、平和的文化に転換しようとした。

以上、一連の3つのプロジェクトは、避難民の生活の中長期的向上を意図する IRC の活動が、次第に、避難民の実態に即した活動へと変化する適応的学習のプロセスをたどったものと考察できる。すなわち、第1プロジェクトでは、避難民の中長期的援助を行うに当たってのパートナーである国内 NGO のレベルアップが目的とされたが、その企画・実施に避難民はまったく参加していない。それに対して、第2プロジェクトでは、大卒の避難民が、避難民コミュニティ改善のリーダーとなった。また、第3プロジェクトでは、時間的・空間的な視野を拡大して、避難民を含む若者の将来のために平和的文化への変容が目指された。

キーワード：国内避難民、非政府組織（NGO）、スーダン

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